Using hand-collected data, we document the details of the ex-ante severance contract and the ex-post separation pay given to S&P500 CEOs upon departing from their company. We analyze for the determinants of whether or not a departing CEO receives separation pay in excess of her severance contract. This excess separation pay is on average, $8 million, which amounts to close to 242% of a CEO's annual compensation. We investigate several potential explanations for this phenomenon and find evidence that in voluntary CEO departures, excess separation pay represents a governance problem. In contrast, we find evidence that in forced departures, excess separation pay represents a need to facilitate a quick and smooth transition from the failed ex-CEO to a new CEO. These results help to shed light on the dual role played by severance compensation and on bargaining games played between boards and departing executives.
agreements (signed at least one year prior to departure). We then compare the dollar award in each severance agreement with the reported actual severance pay given to each CEO upon her leaving her position. The data indicates that the above example of Sovereign is not an idiosyncratic event, but rather represents one of many such cases. Specifically, about 33% of S&P500 CEOs get more than what is pre-specified in their contracts. This is surprising given that even at a time when departing CEOs seemingly have no observed power over the board, those that do obtain excess separation pay, on average, receive a separation package that exceeds their contractual severance amount by close to $8 million. After documenting that this phenomenon is quite common in our sample, we turn to the central question of the paper, which is to explore why some executives receive excess separation pay while others do not.
The observation that executives sometimes receive separation payments in excess of what is specified in their contracts indicates that they have some form of bargaining power when negotiating with the board right before they leave the firm. The question we wish to explore is whether or not these excess payments represent CEO power due to poor corporate governance (i.e., represent something that is harmful to shareholders), or whether these excess separation payments represent an attempt by the board to respond to the incompleteness of contracts in a manner that increases the efficiency of the turnover process.
One hypothesis is that "excess" severance payments are given whenever the board is controlled by the CEO. This is the view in Bebchuk and Fried (2003) , among others. The second hypothesis suggests that excess severance should not be explained by measures of the quality of the governance of the firm, but rather should be explained by variables that measure the extent to which the company will benefit from the quick and smooth departure of the incumbent CEO.
The idea here is that the existing severance contract does not provide the CEO with enough incentive to leave the firm without disrupting the transition process. In the empirical analysis we test these two hypotheses. Our main findings suggest that there is evidence for both the governance hypothesis and for the hypothesis that the board uses excess severance to facilitate a smooth and efficient transition from the previous CEO to a new one. Thus, while some cases of excess separation payment reflect agency problems, other cases seem to reflect the action of a board of directors who is focused on maximizing shareholder value. In particular, we find that excess separation payments made to CEOs whose departure is classified as voluntary represent weak internal corporate governance. In contrast, our findings suggest that excess separation payments to CEOs who are forced out represent an attempt by the board to facilitate an efficient transfer of power from a poorly performing CEO to a potentially better replacement. 6 We first find that for the sample of CEOs that are identified as being forced out of their job, measures of governance do not explain the excess separation payment. In contrast, for the sample of CEOs who are classified as leaving voluntarily, we find that the worse the internal governance of the firm, the higher the excess separation pay.
5 Reported on www.redherring.com February 20, 2007. 6 In a slightly different context Broughman and Fried (2010) find evidence of this type of renegotiation between common shareholders and the controlling venture capitalist shareholder. In particular, they find that common shareholders that have the legal power to impede the sale of a company are able to receive additional payments from the venture capitalist.
Second, we find that for the subsample of CEOs who left voluntarily, past firm performance (as measured by past three-year abnormal stock return) does not explain excess separation pay. However, for the subsample of CEOs who were forced out, we find that the worse their past performance, the higher their excess separation pay. 7 This result is consistent with the idea that CEOs have the ability to prolong the firing process and make it difficult for the company to move on in a different direction with a new hire. The cost of delaying the replacement process is larger for the companies with the worst-performing CEOs, and hence the board of directors in these companies has the greatest incentive to sweeten the deal in order to part ways with the CEO in a quick and amicable fashion. Third, we find that for the subsample of voluntary departures, leverage does not explain excess separation pay; but for the subsample of forced departures, higher leverage implies higher excess separation pay. This suggests that companies that are most concerned about the potential for bankruptcy, due to poor performance and high debt, are the ones who are highly motivated to make the replacement process go smoothly. Thus they award the departing CEO with a pay package that is above the promised severance.
Fourth, we find that CEOs with non-compete and/or non-solicitation clauses in their contracts are more likely to receive excess separation pay. This is true for both the subsample of CEOs who left voluntarily as well as the subsample of CEOs who were forced out. As the existence of these contractual features suggests that these companies are more susceptible to 7 Our result that poorly performing CEOs are being rewarded with larger pay is somewhat reminiscent of the finding in Garvey and Milbourn (2006) who show that CEO's are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad luck. 8 Further discussion of this hypothesis and additional anecdotal evidence of the ability of CEOs to prolong the separation process is provided by Dalton, Daily, and Kesner (1993) .
harmful actions by the departing CEO, the results are in line with the hypothesis that excess separation pay is used to lower the risk of the departing CEO taking future actions that will lower the value of the company.
Fifth, if companies do not have in mind a suitable replacement for the CEO then there will be less of a need to incentivize the incumbent to leave. To test this aspect of the turnover process, we measure whether or not the new incoming CEO is from inside the company and see whether this correlates with excess severance. We find that if the new CEO is an insider, then the amount paid in excess of the contractual severance goes up. This result holds for the subsample of CEOs that are forced out, but not for the subsample of CEOs who leave voluntarily. This is, again, consistent with the hypothesis that excess separation pay is used by the board judiciously at a time when the board forces a CEO out.
Finally, we find some evidence that industry and market-wide conditions also play a role in determining excess separation pay. For example, we find that excess separation pay for voluntary departures is higher when the market is doing well as measured by the level of the market index. 9 We also find that companies in more concentrated industries offer less excess separation payment. However, this result holds only for the forced subsample and not for the subsample of CEOs that departs voluntarily.
Several theoretical papers offer a rationale for the existence of severance contracts. Kahn (1985) suggests that severance pay is part of an optimal contract in which the worker gets partial 9 This result is reminiscent of Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) who find that executive compensation depends on general market conditions and is procyclical in nature. Thus, CEOs that depart during good business conditions, as measured by the level of the market, may also require a larger severance pay.
insurance for the state in which he leaves the firm. More recently, Almazan and Suarez (2003) argue that severance contracts serve to reduce the incentive of strong boards to replace the CEO too frequently and also serve to reduce the incentive of a CEO working for a weak board to entrench herself. Thus, one interpretation of Almazan and Suarez (2003) is that severance contracts are a commitment mechanism that allows for a smoother process of replacing the CEO, which is what we find empirically. Ju, Leland, and Senbet (2002) and Van Wesep (2008) study the effect of severance contracts on firms' risk taking activity. While Ju, Leland, and Senbet (2002) show that severance agreements can be viewed as put options that induce managers to take more risks, Van Wesep (2008) shows that severance contracts will be awarded when managers are able to take excessive risk in order to hide information about their failed investments. Hence, severance pay provides the incentive to reveal unfavorable information about the firm.
Our study attempts to better understand the motives behind making payments to Yermack (2006) finds no variables which explain the level of separation pay for this subsample. In addition, the two studies find very different results for the sample of CEOs that are forced out. In fact, the only similar result in the two papers is that weak external governance increases both separation pay levels and excess severance pay.
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Overall, our study furthers our understanding of severance contracts, separation payments, and more importantly, the intricate bargaining game played between the CEO and the board upon the CEO's departure.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section I, we provide institutional background on CEO severance agreements as well as on their reported separation agreements. In section II, we describe the sample selection process, data and research design.
The analysis is presented in section III. Finally, in section IV we conclude.
I. CEO Severance and Separation Agreements
A severance agreement is a contractual agreement between the CEO and the company which specifies the executive's benefits and obligations in the event that the executive leaves her position with the company.
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Not all CEOs have severance contracts. In our sample, for example, we find that around 13% of CEOs have an effective severance contract in place at the time of their departure. In many cases, however, (around 33% of our sample) CEOs do receive severance pay even though they do not have a severance agreement. Whenever a CEO has a severance agreement, we find that it is signed an average of 6 years before the CEO ends up leaving the company.
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The separation agreement, which is signed within one year of the CEO turnover event, is a contract between the executive and the company that is signed during the separation process.
Namely, it is part of the negotiation process that takes place right before the company and the CEO agree to part ways. Some departing CEOs, whether or not they have a severance contract in place, sign a separation agreement. In our sample, 287 of the 609 events have separation agreements.
Schwab and Thomas (2004) provide a summary of discussions with legal practitioners who are actively engaged in CEO employment/separation agreement negotiations. Based on their description, companies normally produce the initial drafts of employment agreements, many of which contain severance compensation. A standard severance contract contains specific payment amounts, such as a payment of multiple times the CEO's base salary and bonus, as well 12 Note that we exclude all CEO departures that are related to change in control following a merger or a takeover.
Thus, we exclude all golden parachute contracts. 13 In many cases contracts are renewed with unchanged severance agreements. This number represents the number of years since a severance contract with the existing features was last signed.
as continuing/immediate vesting of existing executive stocks and options. In return, CEOs usually agree not to compete with the company for a period of one to two years.
In order for the CEO to receive the promised severance amount, the termination event has to be either without "for cause" or due to "good reason". The term "for cause" is specifically defined in the contract, and usually includes conditions such as willful misconduct or breach of fiduciary duties. However, the definition of "for cause" in the agreements does not normally include CEO incompetence or poor firm performance. Hence, based on these severance agreements, CEOs can still obtain the pre-specified severance amount in the event of termination due to poor firm performance. Similarly, "good reason" is narrowly defined in severance 
II. Data Description
The analyses in this paper utilize two types of data. The main dataset consists of hand- In total we identify 609 events that meet these criteria. For each of these 609 events we read the 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, and proxy statements and hand-collect details of any existing severance agreement as well as any separation agreement signed by the company and the CEO 14 In the example we present only the severance and separation agreement summary obtained from a proxy statement due to the length of the actual severance and separation contracts. In the analysis of the paper we read through the full contract to obtain all relevant details.
upon her leaving her position. We locate the severance and separation contracts by searching for such terms as "employment agreement", "severance contract", "severance agreement", "separation agreement", "termination of employment", "severance", "separation", "contract", "agreement", "executive agreement", "employee agreement", and "termination arrangement".
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We require that the severance contract is in place at least one year prior to the turnover event.
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For each severance contract, we record the terms of the agreement, such as one-time severance amount, multiples of salary and bonus, future consulting fees, immediate vesting of restricted shares and options, additional pension benefits, contract duration, reasons that can trigger the contracts to be effective, non-compete and/or non-solicit clauses, health care and life insurance benefits, gross tax payment, legal fees, access to private jet, office and secretarial supports.
For the separation agreement, which is signed within a year of the departure date, we collect similar information about the specific actual payments that will be made to the departing CEO. This separation agreement may be exactly the same as the previous severance contract or may be different.
For each CEO we calculate the dollar difference between the amounts paid to the CEO upon departure and the amounts that the severance contract specifies should have been paid to the CEO. We obtain the severance contractual dollar amount directly from the severance contract 15 In this paper, we specifically do not study change-in-control agreements which are agreements that become effective only when a "change-in-control" event occurs. 16 In a few cases new severance agreements were signed right before a departure. We ignore these contracts and record the details of the severance contract prior to that. This is because these new severance contracts appear to be written in order to justify ex-post what the board was planning to award the departing CEO.
if supplied by the firm; otherwise, we calculate the contractual dollar amount by employing the most recent year of CEO compensation data if the contractual terms involve certain multiples of salary and bonus. For instance, if the contract awards the CEO with five times her salary and bonus, then we obtain the dollar amount by multiplying the CEO's most recent year's salary and bonus by five. In addition, if the severance contract contains terms for immediate vesting of restricted options, we estimate the amount by using un-exercised un-exercisable option values, which is the estimation of the intrinsic value of the un-exercisable options at year end; and for restricted shares, we estimated it with unvested stock values.
As for the actual separation pay amount, we obtain this actual separation dollar amount directly from the separation contract, if provided by the company; otherwise, if a separation contract is absent, we search the proxy statement for any additional "good-bye" payment that the firm gave the CEO (usually the company specifies in the proxy statement when some additional payments have been made to the CEO as a "good-bye" bonus). Whenever a departing CEO is able to negotiate to have some or all of their unvested restricted stocks and options fully or partially vested, we obtain the estimated value of such stock and option grants from the separation agreement directly (if provided in the proxy statement); or else, we estimate the amount by using un-exercised un-exercisable option values and unvested stock values. Also, if the CEO stays with the firm as a chairman or consultant and receives a compensation that is the same or higher than the compensation she received as a CEO, we include that amount as well.
When calculating the dollar difference between the severance and separation amounts, we also consider the CEO's pension plan. For example, when the severance contract makes no mention of the CEO's pension, but later in the separation agreement, the firm allows for additional years of service credited toward the CEO's pension plan, then we obtain the present value of such additional benefits from searching the firm's proxy statement.
For both of our severance and separation dollar amount calculations, we do not include the gross tax payment, health insurance costs, legal fees, and fringe benefits, such as access to private jet, office and secretarial supports, due to the difficulty of valuing these benefits.
Finally, for each event we follow the methodology used in Parrino (1997) and classify whether the turnover event is a forced turnover or a voluntary turnover. We supplement the data with financial information about the company and the CEO from CRSP, Compustat, RiskMetrics, Thomson Reuters, and ExecuComp.
In Table I , we report the definition of variables used in the analyses. In Table II, we provide descriptive statistics on contract, company and CEO characteristics. For the full sample of 609 CEOs, we see that the average contractual severance payment for those 81 CEOs with a severance contract was 9.15 million dollars. In contrast, the actual amount specified in the final separation contract for those 287 CEOs that received a non-zero payment was 9.5 million dollars.
The difference between the actual and promised pay for the full sample of 609 CEOs is, on average, 3.26 million dollars.
Out of the 609 CEOs, 287 received payment at departure while only 81 of the CEOs had explicit severance contracts prior to departing. Thus, separation pay is given many times even though the company is not required to provide any severance payment to the CEO. Whenever the CEO does have a severance contract, we observe that it is signed, on average, more than six years prior to termination.
The average tenure of the CEO (either as CEO or as an employee) at the time of departure is 24.79 years. Founder CEOs represent less than 10% of the sample, totaling 52. Out of the sample of 609, we are able to identify 112 CEOs (about 18%) who are forced out. This number is slightly lower than the 24% reported in Yermack (2006) , but higher than the 12% reported in Parrino (1997). Our sample of CEOs tends to own around 3.66% of the firm's equity, which is close to the 3.7% reported in Griffith (1999) . About 72% of the CEOs stay with the firm as chairman of the board after resigning from their position as CEO.
An average of 72% of board members for our sample companies are classified as independent.. This percentage is similar to the number reported in Sundaram and Yermack (2007) , who found that 79.2% of directors are independent. As for the stock return prior to departure we see that the average abnormal return for the full sample is positive, again suggesting that we have many voluntary departures of CEOs whose wealth has recently gone up.
In Table II , we also separate out the sample into two subsamples according to whether or not the CEO ended up with an exit package that was larger than their severance agreement. Out of 609 observations, 246 CEOs had a difference in pay at the time of departure, with an average difference in pay totaling more than 8 million dollars. In contrast, 363 CEOs received a separation pay that was in accordance with their severance contract. As can be seen from the table, there appear to be several differences between the two subsamples. For example, CEOs with excess severance appear more likely to have been founders and to stay at the firm after stepping down. These CEOs also tend to have non-compete and non-solicit clauses in their contracts and work for companies that have weaker internal governance. Finally, they appear to leave their positions during times when the market is doing well.
In Table III , we report some additional contract values when separating the sample based on whether or not the CEO left the firm voluntarily or whether she was forced out of her office.
As will be seen shortly, this division of the data will be most informative about the reasons for excess severance. The first thing to notice is that the CEOs who were forced out are about equally likely to receive excess severance as those CEOs that leave voluntarily. Also, conditional on receiving excess severance, fired CEOs tend to get much more in excess severance than CEOs that depart voluntarily. For example, for the subsample of CEOs who had an initial severance agreement and were eventually forced out, the mean difference between actual and contractual pay is almost 17 million dollars. For CEOs that departed voluntarily, the mean difference is 7 million on average. Moreover, among those CEOs who receive excess separation pay, the excess amount is, on average, 2.4 times the CEOs' total annual compensation.
III. Results
Excess severance pay may be explained by different factors in the forced and voluntary subsamples. Thus, we conduct the multivariate analysis separately for these two groups. We start by defining the dependent variable as the dollar value of the difference between the actual and contractual separation pay, where the contractual pay is the pay that was specified in the severance agreement. We then regress this variable on several company, CEO, and market level variables. Because the dependent variable is zero for many of the observations and positive for others, we employ the Tobit model for the analyses. All CEO and firm characteristics are taken in the year prior to the CEO leaving her position.
The independent variables are chosen to measure the two alternative motives that firms have when awarding the CEO with an exit package. These variables measure the governance of the firm, the potential benefit to the firm from replacing the CEO, the extent to which the CEO has the ability to harm the firm after departing, and the economic conditions in the market at the time of CEO departure. Table IV Tables VII and VIII , we provide the correlation matrix for the various independent variables for the two subsamples, respectively. Table IV suggests that past performance does not explain excess severance for the subsample of executives who left voluntarily, while some measures of governance seem to matter. As is the case for the forced sample, here too non-compete and non-solicit clauses are associated with higher excess severance pay. In both panels, excess severance pay is more likely to happen when overall market conditions are good.
The results from the Tobit regressions are provided in Table V for the sample of CEOs that were forced out and in Table VI for the sample of CEOs who left voluntarily. From Model 1
of Table V , we see that the lower the stock return prior to the dismissal event, the higher the excess severance. This result implies that excess severance is given to those CEOs who have done the most damage to the firm. This may seem counterintuitive at first. Our interpretation of the result is that the worst CEOs are the ones who the firm needs to get rid of the quickest. Thus, as long as the incumbent CEO has an ability to delay their departure (via such actions as law suits or derailing the hiring and search process for the new CEO), then we would expect the board to provide them with additional incentives to leave the firm. The second result, from Model 1 and Model 2, is that governance measures do not matter in the sample of executives that are forced out. Namely, excess severance does not seem to be explained by the poor internal or external governance of the firm.
Models 3 and 4 of Table V indicate that existence of non-compete or non-solicit clauses in the CEOs' contracts are also correlated with excess severance. In particular, the existence of either of these clauses implies a larger amount of excess severance. The intuition for this result is that non-solicit or non-compete clauses will only be put in the contract when the company fears that the CEO can harm the firm by leaving it and going to competitors. Hence, these are also the situations where ex-post, the board wants to make sure that the departing CEO is (relatively)
happy by giving her additional severance.
In Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Table V we control for whether or not the incoming CEO is from outside the company. The idea is that if the board already has a candidate from inside the firm, it will be important to have a quick transition. 17 We find a negative coefficient consistent with the above argument. In Models 6, 7, and 8 of the table we include a measure of industry competition. The results show that CEOs that are forced out receive more excess pay in less concentrated industries. The intuition here is that in less concentrated industries there are more outside options for a replacement CEO, which means that the company will have a greater incentive to replace the incumbent without delay. This is somewhat similar to Parrino's (1997) argument, which states that CEO termination is more likely in industries that have many similar companies.
Finally, in all specifications, we find leverage to be positively correlated with excess severance. This is consistent with the idea that more levered firms are at a higher risk of 17 Parrino (1997) provides a comprehensive analysis of the choice between hiring the new CEO from within the firm or from the outside.
bankruptcy, given their poor performance in the past, and hence are in great need of a quick turnaround to recovery. This increases the pressure on the board to ensure a smooth replacement process.
The results for the subsample of CEOs who leave voluntarily are given in Table VI. These results are very different than those obtained in the analysis of the sample of executives who were forced out. In Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Table VI we find that past returns do not explain excess severance. Therefore, for the voluntary subsample it does not appear that severance is used as a tool to hasten the departure of the CEO. In addition, these models indicate that governance plays an important role. A less independent board tends to award the departing CEO with larger excess severance. A founder CEO is likely to receive larger excess severance.
However, companies with weaker external governance (as measured by the G-index) tend to award lower excess severance. The fact that weaker external governance is associated with lower excess pay is consistent with the argument made in Yermack (2006) , who suggests that "a company at a low risk of takeover may feel a diminished need to use severance pay to deter ex-CEO from participating in a hostile raid".
Models 5 and 6 show that the existence of non-compete or non-solicit clauses increases the likelihood of getting higher excess pay (as was the case for the forced-out subsample). This is consistent with the idea that firms are willing to pay extra good-bye payment to ensure departing CEOs will not compete against the firm in the future. Model 7 looks at the additional factor of whether the new CEO is hired from outside the firm and finds no statistical impact on excess severance. This is consistent with our argument that excess severance in this subsample is not related to the turnover process. Namely, for voluntary CEO departures the board does not need to offer further incentive for the CEO to leave, even when they have a suitable (internal) candidate waiting.
Model 8 shows that industry competition does not impact the amount of excess severance. Model 9 shows that all our main results continue to hold, even after controlling for
CEOs staying as either a chairman or a consultant after stepping down from the CEO position.
Model 10 indicates that CEOs departing during periods where the market is doing well (as measured by the level of the S&P500 index) tend to receive higher excess exit packages. If shareholders engage in less monitoring during periods when the economy is doing well, then the CEO will be able to extract more rents from a friendly board. This result is consistent with Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) , who show that executives tend to obtain higher compensation when the market is doing well.
Finally, we see that for the voluntary departure sample, leverage does not explain excess severance. This again is consistent with the argument that the importance of replacing the CEO to avoid the costs of financial distress is critical in the cases when the CEO is forced out and not in those where the CEO leaves for other reasons.
A. Robustness
In order to ensure the robustness of our results, we conduct several additional tests. These tests are reported in Table IX for the sample of CEOs who were forced out and in Table X divided by the total salary of the departing CEO. We find that the results remain the same using this specification.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we document the phenomenon that CEO exit packages are sometimes larger than what is contractually specified in their severance agreement. Our analysis of the dollar difference in actual versus contractual exit pay shows that the cross section of this difference can not only be explained by weak internal corporate governance, but also by boards acting in the interest of shareholders. In particular, we find that weak corporate governance explains the existence of excess severance pay for the subsample of CEOs who depart voluntarily. In contrast, excess severance pay is not related to weak governance in those events where the CEO is forced out. For these forced-out CEOs, excess pay is given in order to assure that the company moves forward in a way that is most beneficial to the shareholders.
The results overall indicate that severance pay and excess severance pay, while seemingly reflecting poor governance, may actually play a critical role in the efficient replacement process of poorly-performing CEOs. This aspect of executive compensation, which has received limited attention to date, can provide interesting details about how the board and the CEO interact.
Appendix 1: Sidhu and Sovereign Bank Severance and Separation Agreements
Ex-ante severance agreement:
Sovereign Bank entered into an employment agreement, dated March 1, 1997, with Jay S. Sidhu, which superseded, in its entirety, Mr. Sidhu's then existing employment agreement. Mr. Sidhu's agreement has an initial term of five years and, unless terminated as set forth therein, is automatically extended annually to provide a new term of five years except that, at certain times, notice of nonextension may be given, in which case the agreement will expire at the end of its then-current term. No such notice has been given. The agreement provides a base salary, which, if increased by action of the Board, becomes the new base salary provided thereafter by the agreement. In addition, the agreement provides, among other things, a right to participate in any bonus plan approved by the Board and insurance, vacation, pension and other fringe benefits for Mr. Sidhu.
If Mr. Sidhu's employment is terminated without cause (as defined therein), or if Mr. Sidhu voluntarily terminates employment for good reason (as defined therein), Mr. Sidhu becomes entitled to severance benefits under the agreement. The term good reason includes the assignment of duties and responsibilities inconsistent with Mr. Sidhu's status as President and Chief Executive Officer of Sovereign, a reduction in salary or benefits or a reassignment which requires Mr. Sidhu to move his principal residence more than 100 miles from Sovereign's principal executive office. If any such termination occurs, Mr. Sidhu will be paid an amount equal to five times the sum of (i) his highest annual base salary under the agreement, and (ii) the average of his annual bonuses with respect to the three calendar years immediately preceding his termination. Such amount will be payable in sixty equal monthly installments. In addition, in the event of such termination, Mr. Sidhu will be entitled to continuation of certain insurance and other specified benefits for sixty months or until he secures substantially similar benefits through other employment, whichever shall first occur. Further, Mr. Sidhu will be entitled to additional retirement benefits to which he would have been entitled had his employment continued through the then remaining term of the agreement, including increased benefits under Sovereign's long-term incentive plans. If the payments and benefits under the agreement, when aggregated with other amounts received from Sovereign and Sovereign Bank, are such that Mr. Sidhu becomes subject to excise tax on excess parachute payments under Code Sections 4999 and 280G he will receive additional payments equal to such excise tax and any incremental income taxes he may be required to pay by reason of the receipt of additional amounts under the agreement. Sovereign estimates that, if Mr. Sidhu had terminated employment as of August 1, 2006 under circumstances entitling him to the above-described severance benefits, he would have been entitled to receive approximately $13 million, exclusive of the non-cash benefits, additional retirement benefits, and any potential excise tax-related payments.
If Mr. Sidhu's employment terminates by reason of his disability, he will be entitled to continuation of 80% of the annual base salary and bonus described above, less amounts payable under any disability plan of Sovereign, until the earliest of (i) his return to employment, (ii) his attainment of age 65, or (iii) his death. Provision is also made generally for the continuation of insurance and other specified benefits for such period, as well as additional credits for retirement benefit purposes.
The agreement contains provisions restricting Mr. Sidhu's right to compete with Sovereign and Sovereign Bank during the period he is receiving severance or disability benefits thereunder, except under certain circumstances. Mr. Sidhu will also receive payments of $40,000 per month for 36 months for providing the consulting services described above. Mr. Sidhu is not entitled to any perquisites in connection with providing the consulting services or otherwise under the Retirement-Resignation and Transition Agreement. Mr. Sidhu also received fees totaling $36,000 for service as a non-employee director of Sovereign and Sovereign Bank through December 31, 2006. Mr. Sidhu also participated in our deferred compensation plans, including our Retirement Plan, which is applicable to all of our team members, and our Bonus Recognition and Retention Program, which is applicable to certain of our senior executive officers. Under these plans, Mr. Sidhu is entitled to his earned and vested account balances which will be paid in accordance with the terms of such plans. Under the Retirement-Resignation and Transition Agreement, Mr. Sidhu forfeited approximately $640,000 in value of certain existing unvested restricted stock awards, based on a $24.00 stock price. 
